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A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE UNDER THE IOWA
WATER PERMIT SYSTEM-Part Two*
N. WILLIAM HINESt

ProcedureForProcessingOriginalA pplications

B.

1. The Application
As befalls any new regulatory agency created to perform a licensing-type function, the first few years are primarily devoted to
processing the flood of original applications. During the first year

and a half of operation (the agency was created in mid-1957)
permit applications were received from 762 users, excluding highway
applications. Almost exactly half of the applications during this ini-

tial rush involved irrigation uses. Over time the volume of irrigation applications slowed down to an average of about 16 per year
between 1960 and 1965 while the numbers of applications from
most other types of uses have increased gradually.18 4
The most noticeable increase over time has been in applications to
impound water for storage purposes. Although it might be hypo-

0

Part One of this article appeared in 7 Natural Resources J. 499-554 (1967).
t Professor of Law, University of Iowa, Iowa City.
184. The following table shows the frequency of original applications over time.
The early rush of irrigation permits is the most striking feature of the table. The
general increase in storage permits is also noteworthy.
TABLE 6
Applications Received
Use
Industrial
Materials Production
Power Production
Food Processing
Manufacturing
Air Conditioning

1957* 1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965 * 0

22
16
3
3
0

125
15
4
6
5

74
0
5
4
2

39
1
4
3
1

32
1
1
2
3

16
0
3
6
0

18
0
2
5
0

26
0
5
3
0

6
0
1
1
0

Irrigation
Farms
Golf Courses
Specialty Crops

253
6
41

135
4
24

37
1
3

10
2
1

10
2
5

11
2
6

24
6
1

20
8
10

7
1
1

Municipal
Recreation
Storage
Other
Total

13
8
2
0
367

26
10
41
0
395

13
5
66
2
212

10
1
51
2
125

8
1
64
3
132

16
5
57
2
124

11
2
97
2
168

7
3
98
3
183

4
0
50
4
75

O

*

1957 figures represent approximately one-half year.
1965 figures cover only the first six months of the year.

NATURAL

RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 8

thesized that these applications represent stream irrigators who are
endeavoring to assure the availability of water should the flow in
their stream source diminish to the protected level, a check of the
permits does not bear this out. Most are small impoundments
created for soil conservation and livestock watering purposes.
The procedure evolved for processing original applications for
diversion, storage, or withdrawal of waters of the state of Iowa are
relatively complex. However, a Procedural Guide, published by the
Natural Resources Council, which contains sample forms, detailed
instructions for filling out applications, and hearing procedures,
helps to relieve this situation.""5
The Council has provided five basic forms. The form to be used
depends upon the intended use of the water. There are application
forms for the particular uses of highway construction, irrigation,
storage, and sand, gravel, or rock production. Also, a general form
is provided for other users who intend to divert, store, or withdraw
water.
The general application form for water use requires an identification of the intended source and the exact location of the point of
withdrawal, the intended use of the water, the maximum rate and
minimum quantity of water desired, and period of the year that
withdrawal is desired. The application must be accompanied by the
statutory filing fee of $15.00 and by a map accurately portraying
the points of diversion or withdrawal, use, and discharge of water.
The specialized application forms vary from the general one only
as their particular use requires.
The highway form contemplates water use in conjunction with a
certain road construction project. The irrigation form requires
specification of the size and description of the land to be irrigated.
Also, the application should indicate not only boundaries and water
sources, but also topographical features of the land to be irrigated
and man-made structures thereon. The storage form requires, in
addition to the normal information, the drainage area of the impoundment and, in cases where the storage area is to be located on a
stream, an explanation of the provisions to be made in the impounding structure to assure a continuance of flow. If the water is to be
stored for subsequent withdrawal and use, either the general form or
the appropriate special form must accompany the storage permit
application. The form for use of water in the production of sand,
185. Iowa Natural Resources Council, Procedural Guide (1961).
as Procedural Guide]

[Hereinafter cited
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gravel, or rock materials additionally requires the applicant to state
a division between the water lost by evaporation or hauled away in
the product and that which is merely pumped from the pits. The
application in each case is to be submitted by the person or persons
having legal jurisdiction by ownership, lease, or easement over the
area where the water is to be diverted or withdrawn and used.
When the application is received in Des Moines, it is reviewed by
the Commissioner. If the application is incomplete or obviously
erroneous, the Commissioner may request additional information or
a new application. Likewise, if the $15.00 fee is not enclosed,
the application may be held up. Once the application is determined
to be correct and complete, a time and a place for a hearing is set.
Notice of the hearing is then published once each week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper within the county in which the permit
is sought. The date of the last publication must not be less than ten
nor more than thirty days before the hearing. A copy of the notice is
sent to interested organizations and officers of the state. Notices
are also sent to any person who has requested in writing that he be
mailed a copy of the notice of any hearing affecting that area."86
2. Pre-hearing Investigation
Prior to the actual hearing, the hearing officer may conduct an
informal pre-hearing investigation. 87 This occasion is used to ques186. Iowa Code §455A.19 (1962). The following is an example of the notice ordinarily distributed by the Commissioner:
NOTICE OF HEARING ON AN APPLICATION
FOR A PERMIT TO STORE WATER
IN WOODBURY COUNTY, IOWA
Notice is hereby given that there is now on file in the Office of the Iowa Natural
Resources Council, State House, Des Moines, Iowa an application from Raymond
Petersen for a permit to store water for erosion control and recreational use upon
his land generally described as the NE '4 Section 32, T88N, R42W, Woodbury County,
Iowa.
Applicant requests a permit to store water in the maximum amount of 33.8 acre-feet
at a maximum rate of natural runoff from 199 acres throughout each year.
Notice is further given that a public hearing will be held at 1:30 P.M., DST, on
May 16, 1966, Room 526, State Office Building, Des Moines, Iowa, at which time and
place or at any adjournment, the Water Commissioner or his Deputy will take evidence
by the applicant and any other person either in support of or in opposition to the
granting of a permit.
R. G. Bullard
Water Commissioner
187. The statute requires the Council to "cause to be made an investigation of the
effect of such (requested) use upon the material flow of such watercourse, the effect of
any such use upon the owners of any land which might be affected by such use, and the
"
effect of any such use upon the state comprehensive plan for water resources. ...
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tion the applicant about any unusual aspects of his application. The
effect that various modifications might have on the applicant's operation are discussed. Frequently, the hearing officer will inform the
applicant of relevant Council policies pertaining to the applicant's
use, and he will ordinarily explain some of the guidelines used by the
Commissioner.
When the hearing is held on or reasonably near the location of the
proposed beneficial use, an informal inspection of the premises and
equipment is usually made by the hearing officer just prior to the
hearing. This gives the hearing officer first-hand knowledge of what
is actually proposed and enables him to make a more informed
determination.
One example of the utility of this informal pre-hearing meeting
relates to an irrigator's request for an unreasonable amount of water.
The policy of the Council has been to limit irrigation permittees to
an annual use of not in excess of 18 acre inches of water in the
188
western part of the state and 15 acre inches in the eastern part.
This policy is grounded in scientific data showing that these amounts
are the maximum that could be beneficially applied in Iowa. Often
the applicant applies for an amount of water not reasonably related
to his needs. In such a situation, the Commssioner takes an active
role and may attempt to pursuade the applicant to decrease, or where
appropriate, increase his requests to conform to his needs.
The purpose of this informal investigation by the Commissioner
is essentially twofold. It provides the Commissioner with an opportunity to get a good look at the applicant's needs and the possible means of satisfying those needs. At the same time, it affords the
applicant an opportunity to learn what will be required of him and
perhaps to obtain an assessment of the efficiency and possible improvements of his system. The whole process is very similar to a
pre-trial conference where all concerned can iron out any small differences and determine the real issues to be emphasized at the hearing. The hearings on highway and storage applications are usually
held in the Commissioner's office in Des Moines. Hearings on
applications for other uses generally are held in the county in which
89
the use will be made.1
188. These limits are not inflexible. If the applicant can demonstrate a need for a
greater amount of water owing to exceptional circumstances, the standard amounts
may be exceeded. Most commonly such enterprises as orchards or truck farms may
receive permits for irrigation applications in excess of the normal maximums.
189. Interview with Deputy Water Commissioner Clifford Peterson in Iowa City,
Iowa, November 8, 1965.
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3. Hearings
The hearing is held at the time and place designated in the notice,
with the Water Commissioner or one of his deputies acting as hearing officer. Ordinarily about 36 days now elapses between the time
application is made for a permit and the date of the hearing. 190 This
period varies somewhat according to the type of use involved, but in
all cases it is considerably less than what it was during the earlier
years of administration. During the initial flood of applications the
Council decided as a matter of policy to postpone the hearings on
applications to withdraw stream water for irrigation.' The protected minimum flows were not yet set so it would have been difficult,
if not impossible to properly appraise the applications. Any serious
prejudice from this policy of deferment was seemingly removed in
most cases by invoking the statutory authorization to continue the
190. The table below indicates by uses the average lapse of time in days between
the date an original application was received by the Commissioner and the date a
hearing was held. The number of permits included in each classification is shown at
note 202 infra. The range in time lapses is substantial. The four recreation permits
granted in 1960 spent an average of 494 days in the hands of the Commissioner before
a hearing was held. At the other extreme, the ten applications for food processing in
1962 and hydrostatic testing in 1961 and 1965 required an average of only twenty-three
days before a hearing was held.
Table 7
Time Lapse Between Application and Hearing
Use

1957* 1958

Industrial
Materials Production
Power Production
Food Processing
Manufacturing
Air Conditioning

NI+ 124
NI
89
NI
61
NI
85
NI
32

Irrigation
Farms
Golf Courses
Specialty Crops
Municipal
Recreation
Storage
Other
Average for all uses

53
NI
NI
31
NI
NI
NI
48

177
128
144
96
79
58
NI
127

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965**

183
337
171
110
159

99
NI
28
33
36

39
89
49
62
25

31
NI
23
25
NI

32
NI
28
31
NI

33
NI
31
33
NI

28
NI
28
33
NI

265
402
246
120
226
52
34
212

318
271
266
120
494
36
28
170

185
28
49
24
32
30
23
42

80
28
28
29
244
27
25
42

38
34
NI
32
60
38
28
36

46
29
28
293
48
30
29
46

36
46
31
27
25
38
23
36

+ NI means no permits were issued in this year for this use.
1957 figures represent approximately one-half year.
1965 figures represent only the first six months of the year.
191. Interview with Water Commissioner Richard Bullard in Iowa City, Iowa, Oct.
20, 1965.
*

•
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existing use pending determination on the application. Possibly some
applicants for new uses were harmed by the policy, but no evidence
of complaints was found.
Under authority of the water statute, the Natural Resources
Council has promulgated general rules of procedures for the conduct of hearings. 192 The rules provide that the applicant may either
represent himself or be represented by counsel at the hearing. In
point of fact, today many applicants do not appear at all, but elect
rather to stand on their application.
The hearing is public but other interested persons who wish to
offer evidence or enter an appearance at the hearing must sign the
register furnished by the hearing officer. Briefs and opening statements are allowed but are not necessary. When a person desires to
give an opening statement, he must do so immediately prior to the
presentation of his evidence. Stipulation of facts between the parties
prior to the hearing is encouraged. However, no stipulation is binding upon the Water Commissioner.
The rules place upon the applicant the burden of proof in establishing the necessity and propriety of a permit. The necessity and
propriety are established by showing the following factors:
( 1 ) That there is water available.
(2) That the applicant has the present ability to put the water to
the proposed beneficial use.
(3) That the use to which the water is to be devoted is consistent
with the policies and principles of beneficial use as set forth in
Chapter 455A, Iowa Code 1958, as amended.
(4) That the proposed diversion, storage, or withdrawal of
water will not be detrimental to the public interest, including
drainage and levee districts.
(5) That the proposed diversion, storage, or withdrawal of
water will not be detrimental to the interests of property
owners with prior or superior rights who might be affected. 93
There is no standard set for the level of proof of the evidence
presented but presumably it is like that of civil trials, that is, a preponderance of the evidence.
In establishing such evidence, witnesses can either testify in narrative form or in response to questions asked. The Commissioner has
discretion to allow leading questions. Hearsay is admissible, as are
192. See Procedural Guide III F.
193. Id. at §7.
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exhibits which are accompanied by proper foundation testimony. All
persons are given the right of cross-examination of any witness.
However, it appears by statute that an interested person not a party
cannot cross examine the witness himself but must do so through an
attorney. 94 At any time during the hearing, the hearing officer has
the prerogative to call and to examine any witness himself.
Except for the provision requiring a party to give his opening
statement immediately prior to the presentation of his evidence, the
order of the hearing follows the basic order of a court trial in Iowa.
Testimony and evidence of the applicant and persons supporting the
application is first presented. This is followed by testimony and
evidence of persons opposing the application. Then the closing arguments of the applicant and those in support of the application are
heard, followed by the closing arguments of the opponents. The
applicant is reserved the right to make a final rebuttal argument.
There is no requirement either by statute or Council rule for preserving a record of the hearings on an application. However, the
policy of the Commissioner is to make a transcription of each hearing through the use of a tape recorder. The hearing tapes are kept
at least until after the period of appeal to the Council expires, 30
days from the date of the filing of the final determination. In addition
to serving as an invaluable tool for helping the hearing officer review
the testimony when he is writing the final determination, the tapes
are also valuable in case an appeal is filed with the Council.' 95
Once the hearing has been concluded, it cannot be reopened unless
new evidence becomes available which could not, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, have been presented at the original hearing.
The motion for reopening may be made within 30 days before the
filing of the determination or within 30 days thereafter. The
Commissioner must then give ten days written notice by ordinary mail
of the time, date, and place of the reopened hearing to each person
who filed an appearance at the original hearing and to the person
requesting a reopening of the hearing. Notice also is given to per194. Iowa Code § 455A.19(4). "Any interested person may appear and present
evidence at the hearing, and may be represented by counsel, who shall have the right
to question others who present evidence." Such a rule seems a little ridiculous. The
considerable discretion vested in the hearing officer would appear to allow him to permit a party without counsel to question other witnesses.
195. The Attorney General of Iowa has ruled that in his opinion the use, preservation and destruction of tape recordings by the hearing officers is a procedural matter
wholly within the control and discretion of the Council and thus it is proper for the
Council to destroy the record of hearings of a non-controversial nature after the
period of appeal has expired. A Letter Opinion from the office of Att'y. Gen. of
Iowa to Iowa Nat. Res. Council, dated May 14, 1959, on file in the Council's office.
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sons who have requested notice of all hearings in that area and
interested state officers and agencies. In no case may a hearing be
reopened if an appeal has been taken to the Natural Resources
Council.' 9 6
Most applications for permits are not contested today. There
was a period earlier in the history of the administration, however,
when contests were the rule and not the exception. When the system
first went into effect, almost all applications were opposed by one
group or another. In 1957, only four permits were granted and appearances were filed in each case opposing the granting of the permit. In 1958, 248 permits were granted and 83 appearances were
made in opposition to them. Certain cities and industries would oppose any application for a permit for consumptive withdrawal upstream from them on the grounds that such withdrawal would
jeopardize their water supply. In addition, the Iowa Conservation
Commission opposed applications for irrigation withdrawals on the
basis that any lowering of a stream damaged fish and wildlife. Many
of these objections were not based upon facts or knowledge of the
law's operation and merely tended to add general confusion and
97
undue length to the hearings.
The fears of many of these groups gradually diminished and all
eventually discontinued the practice of opposing applications as a
matter of principle. Lack of success in preventing the issuance of the
196. Procedural Guide III F § 11.
197. The following table shows the appearances entered at hearings by objectors
according to the character of the objection. For this purpose, objectors were classed
according to the use they represented, Municipality, Industry, Downstream Domestic
Users, Well User, Recreation, and Other. The table documents the troubled times of the
early years of administration when various fears were at large concerning the effect
of the granting of a permit. For example, persons representing recreational interests
objected 155 times in 1959, and almost all of these were at the hearings on irrigation
permits.
Table 8
Objectors Classified
Class
Municipality
Industrial
Downstream
Domestic User
Well User
Recreational
Other
Total
*

•

1957* 1958

1959

1960

1962

1963

3
0
0

27
2
10

40
40
21

30
3
9

5
0
2

17
0
0

28
1
4

3
0
5

3
0
2

0
3
0
6

4
39
1
83

11
155
1
268

9
49
3
103

5
0
2
14

9
3
2
31

3
3
1
40

4
1
6
19

0
1
2
8

1961

1957 figures represent approximately one-half year.
1965 figures represent only the first six months of the year.

1964

1965*
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permit was undoubtedly one factor contributing to the cessation of
objections, but according to the Commissioner, the explanation lies
more in the fact that objectors appearing at the hearings usually returned home satisfied even though a permit was granted. Explanation by the hearing officer of the effect of the requested withdrawal
of water upon the objector's water supply was normally sufficient to
allay the unfounded worries of most objectors. 9 '
4. Final Determination
A written determination must be made by the Water Commissioner on all applications. This determination states his findings and
must be filed with the Council and a copy mailed to the applicant and
anyone else who filed an appearance at the hearing and has requested
199
a copy.
In making the determination, the Commissioner is directed by the
Council to "seek all available pertinent scientific and technical information not presented at the hearing, concerning the availability
and present or future use of all water connected to the source for
which the permit is requested."2 ° This information may be used by
the Commissioner in making his final determination regardless of
whether it was presented at the hearing. Generally, the findings for
the final determination are derived from six sources:
(1) The application;
(2) Evidence presented at the hearing;
(3) Policies and principles of "beneficial use;"
(4) Policies of the Council;
(5) Results of Water Commission investigations;
(6) Technical reference works and basic data studies.
The acquired expertise of the Water Commissioner is also utilized.2 '
If, after due consideration of all the pertinent factors and guidelines the Water Commissioner finds that the granting of the permit
applied for will not be detrimental to the public interest or the interests of property owners with prior or superior rights, and, where
applicable, that the minimum flow of a stream is preserved and
neither navigability nor the pollution control laws will be impaired,
the permit is granted. Such a permit may be granted for any period
198.
Oct. 20,
199.
200.
201.

Interview with Water Commissioner Richard Bullard in Iowa City, Iowa,
1965.
Iowa Code §455A.19(7) (1962).
Procedural Guide III F § 10.
Ibid.
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of time not exceeding ten years. 0 2 The amount of water use autho202. Iowa Code §455A.20 (1962). The following table shows the permits granted
by the Water Commissioner by use and by year, both original and renewal. The
numbers to the left of the dividing line represent original permits granted, the number
to the right renewal permits.
a
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rized may be either less than or equal to the amount applied for.
Ordinarily from the time of the hearing it now takes about 30
days to receive the permit. This is another time interval that has
been substantially decreased as administrative experience has been
gained. 0
5. Appeal
A right of appeal is provided from the Water Commissioner's
determination to the Natural Resources Council. Appeal may be
taken by any party aggrieved by the determination of the Commissioner. Such an appeal must be filed with the Council within 30
days of the determination and must state the grounds of the appeal.
The director of the Council sets the time and date of the hearing and
203. The following table shows the average time lapse between the time an applicant received a hearing on his original application and the time his permit was ultimately granted. The figures tend to document the Council's "go slow" policy on potentially consumptive users practiced during the early years of administration. For
example, in 1960 the average farm irrigation permit granted was received nearly a
year and a half after the hearing. In the later years the figures show relatively prompt
action in issuing the permit.
Table 10
Time Lapse Between Hearing and Permit
Use
Industrial
Materials Production
Power Production
Food Processing
Manufacturing
Air Conditioning
Irrigation
Farms
Golf Courses
Specialty Crops
Municipal
Recreation
Storage
Other
Average for all uses

1965 * *

1957* 1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

NI+ 83
NI 113
NI
62
NI
33
NI
32

97
89
77
137
118

76
NI
10
46
46

28
71
NI
15
28

24
NI
7
37
NI

24
NI
19
92
NI

25
NI
80
28
NI

44
NI
23
8
NI

127
NI
NI

162
81
196

298
158
334

349
297
512

75
82
51

80
18
56

26
130
NI

53
40
75

66
22
162

8
NI
NI
NI
97

63
59
44
NI
111

36
271
31
2
201

18
12
151
6
205

26
37
18
8
30

41
160
12
2
37

64195
9
NI
33

59
10
11
NI
30

23
25
14
15
33

+ NI means no permits were issued in this year for this use.
* 1957 figures approximately one-half year.
o 1965 figures represent only the first six months of the year.
The next table shows the total average time elapsed from the date application is filed
until the date a permit is issued. In essence, this table is a combination of the two
previous tables dealing with time lapse.
(Note 203 Continued on next page)
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everyone who appeared at the Commissioner's
hearing or any hear20 4
ing is given notice by ordinary mail.
By statute, the Council is to prescribe rules and regulations governing the appeal to this body.20 5 The same set of rules and regulations used for the original hearing before the Commissioner has apparently been adopted to cover the hearing on appeal. This means
that the appeal is, in effect, a complete retrial of the original hearing
before the Commissioner.
After hearing all the evidence the Council files its own determination setting forth its findings. The Council apparently applies the
same standards as the Commissioner. A copy of the determination is
sent to the applicant and to any person appearing who in writing re20 6
quests a copy.
Further appeal is permitted if a party is not satisfied with the
Council's determination.2 7 Within 30 days of an adverse determination by the Council, a party may file suit in the district court of
the county in which the property affected is located. Upon receipt of
notice of this appeal, the Council must file a certified transcript of
(Continued from preceding page)
Table 11
Time Lapse from Application to Permit
Use
Industrial
Materials Production
Power Production
Food Processing
Manufacturing
Air Conditioning

1957* 1958
NI+
NI
NI
NI
NI

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965*

207
202
123
118
64

280
426
248
247
277

174
NI
37
79
81

64
159
49
71
52

55
NI
30
62
NI

56
NI
47
123
NI

56
NI
110
61
NI

72
NI
51
40
NI

Irrigation
Farms
Golf Courses
Specialty Crops
Municipal
Recreation
Storage
Other

180
NI
NI
39
NI
NI
NI

339
209
340
157
126
101
NI

562
560
580
154
497
80
36

666
568
779
135
506
151
33

260
110
101
50
69
41
31

150
46
84
70
405
34
27

64
164
NI
96
254
44
28

97
69
103
353
58
38
51

102
68
193
50
50
50
34

Average for alluses

145

236

410

361

66

72

64

70

64

+ NI means no permits were issued in this year for this use.
* 1957 figures represent approximately one-half year.
•* 1965 figures represent only the first six months of the year.
204. Iowa Code § 455A.19(8) (1952).
205. Iowa Code § 455A.19(9) (1962).
206. Ibid.
207. Iowa Code § 455A.37 (1962).
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all proceedings and orders affecting the case with the clerk of the
court. On this appeal the case is again given a complete airing as the
statute provides for the court to hear the matter de novo. In this
round the Council has the burden of showing that its acts and orders
were "reasonable and necessary. ' 20 8 If the Council can show both,
its determination should be affirmed. This required showing by the
Council represents a complete shift of the risk of non-persuasion between the parties. At the original hearing, the applicant must show
by affirmative evidence his right to obtain a permit. On appeal to the
courts, it is the Council which must take the affirmative role.
Appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court is also available to a party
aggrieved by the district court's judgment. The Iowa Rules of Civil
Procedure control the procedures in this appeal. 0 9
On its face the appeal procedures are subject to severe criticism
for their redundancy. As a result of the multiple appeals available,
any aggrieved party may demand no less than three separate full
hearings on the same issue. Further, the scheme provides motivation
to continue appealing by requiring the Council to shoulder the burden of justifying its determination when the third round of appeals
is reached. After losing three full hearings, a party may still try his
luck with the Supreme Court. About the only good thing that can be
said about the appeal procedure is that it has not been invoked frequently. In only nine instances have the Commissioner's determinations been appealed to the Council. In all cases the Commissioner's
findings were sustained. One appeal was filed in the district court,
but it was subsequently dismissed. 210 Thus far good fortune has
smiled on the Council in the form of relatively bountiful water supplies. When water shortages again occur, this seemingly endless appeal procedure could prove to be a substantial obstacle to adminis21
trative efficiency. '
208. Ibid.
209. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 368. Sect. 455A.37 of the act provides that the district
court or Supreme Court may stay the "order" of the Council, but otherwise an appeal
will not stay the operation of an order. This has been interpreted as including permits.
210. The City of West Des Moines filed an appeal in district court challenging the
short duration of the permit it received on the ground that the time was too short to
allow advantageous borrowing. Later a sufficient water supply was obtained without
the construction for which the permit was sought, so the appeal was dismissed.
211. The Iowa Natural Resources Council, Report for the Biennium Ending June
30, 1964 contains the following passage:
"It is again recommended that Section 455A.37 be amended to avoid the
possibility of unwarranted expenditure of State funds through litigation of
appeals encouraged by the statute. This section provides for appeal to the
district court from Resources Council actions and orders and, contrary to
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C.

Transfer of Permits
Section 455A.20 states that a water use permit is an appurtenance
to the land on which the water is used. This indicates that even
though the permit is granted to an individual, it does not confer on
the permittee a general personal privilege to divert, withdraw, or
store water. Instead it allows the use of the specified amount of
water for the specified purpose on that land. If the permittee moves
his water using operation to another location, his permit for use at
the old location does not move with him; a new permit will be required if water is to be used at the new location.212
Consistent with the theory of the permit attaching to a particular
tract of land the statute provides that a permittee may transfer his
interest in the permit by "conveying, leasing, or otherwise trans,,213
ferring the ownership of the land described in the permit ....
Because the permit is appurtenant to the land, presumably no special procedure is required to transfer it. An ordinary deed or lease
should therefore suffice to assign the rights and duties represented
by the permit to the transferee of the land.
The policy of the Commissioner has been to generally discourage
permit transfers. As a practical matter, this policy has taken the
form of inducing applications by the party in possession of land who
will use the water rather than by the land owner. Thus, if a permit
is required for water which will actually be used by a lessee, an effort
is made to encourage the lessee to make the permit application
rather than the owner. If this effort is successful and the lessee is the
applicant, then the permit will usually be granted for the remaining
term of his lease. This is not true for short term leases by farmers
who would be required to apply for a new permit every year, but
normally applicable rules of law, places the burden of proof that such actions
are reasonable and necessary upon the Resources Council. Imposition of the
burden of proof on the regulatory agency tends to encourage appeals from
Resources Council actions and orders, many of which are the result of review
proceedings. Other provisions of this section requiring the Resources Council
to furnish a certified transcript of all proceedings before the Council and providing for a trial de novo on appeal to the district court would seem to afford
ample protection to individual rights."
The bill submitted by the Council to the 1965 session of the Iowa General Assembly
contained a provision changing the burden of proof in appeal. S.F.518 § 4. The bill was
passed, but the section relating to appeal procedure was deleted. Iowa Acts 61st G.A.
ch. 372 (1965).
212. See Iowa Code § 455A.20 (1962).
213. Iowa Code § 455A.30 (1962).
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long term lessees (up to ten years) and lessees who are not likely to
renew their lease are uniformly subjected to this treatment.2 14
If for some reason the lease is terminated before the expiration
date of the water permit, the Commissioner will encourage the departing lessee to cancel his permit voluntarily. The same encouragement is given to owners who sell their property during the term of
their water permit. In this manner, any new owner or lessee will be
required to make his own application for a permit. This gives the
Commissioner the opportunity to make direct contact with the new
user and explain what will be required of him. The Commissioner
feels that this policy leads to a much better understanding between
himself and the user than would be possible otherwise.
The chance to talk to the user also dispels any notions that, because he succeeds to an existing permit, he is not really regulated.
The statute provides that the transferred permit remains "subject
'215
to the principle of beneficial use and the orders of the Council.
The new user has the same duties and obligations as his predecessor
had. However, without the opportunity on the part of the Commissioner to explain what these obligations are, the new user would
likely be uncertain or unaware of them. The policy of the Commissioner therefore appears sound in that it avoids problems later on
for both himself and the user.
D.

Renewal and Modification
The Commissioner's policy is to notify a permittee that his permit
is about to expire approximately 60 days before the permit expiration date. Once notified the water user should then complete and
submit to the Commissioner an application to renew the permit. A
form is provided for this purpose. Permits may be renewed by the
Commissioner if an application for renewal is made before the expiration of the preceeding term. In his application the applicant should
notify the Commissioner of any desired changes in the permit.216
214. Interview with Water Commissioner Richard Bullard in Iowa City, Iowa,
Oct. 20, 1965.
215. Iowa Code § 455A.30 (1962).
216. This table shows the volume and distribution of renewal applications by
years. The figures reveal the approximate pattern that the foregoing discussion of the
administration would lead one to expect. Irrigation renewals were high in 1962-64
because the bulk of the three-year permits were issued 1959-1961. Materials producers
were originally given short term permits because the policy toward them was not yet
settled, therefore many were regularly seeking renewals. Permits of most other indus-
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The Commissioner sends notices of the receipt of the application
for renewal by ordinary mail to all persons who filed an appearance
at the next previous proceeding and to those persons who have requested notice of any hearings affecting that area. If an objection is
filed within 30 days of the date of notice by any person shown to
have an interest, a hearing must be held. Notice of this hearing is
sent to the objector and to the same persons who received notice of
2 17
the application for renewal.
If no objection is made within 30 days and if no change in the
permit terms is requested, then the permit may be renewed without
any hearing. The provision authorizing the granting of renewal applications without hearings was added by amendment in 1965.218 Before that time hearings were required for all renewals. There is no
fee charged for a simple renewal.
If, however, a modification of the terms of the permit is requested
which involves a change in the beneficial use, a change in the place
of such diversion, or an increase in the quantity, time, or rate of
water usage, then the applicant must pay the $15.00 fee as retrial and municipal users have yet to expire the first time. In this table applicants
seeking renewals and those seeking renewal with modification are compared.
Table 12
Renewal Applications
Use

1957* 1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965**

Industrial
Materials Production
Power Production
Food Processing
Manufacturing
Air Conditioning

0
0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0

9
0
0
2
0

4
1
0
0
0

11
5
1
3
1

11
0
1
1
0

13
1
1
0
0

3
0
0
1
1

3
0
0
1
0

Irrigation
Farms
Golf Courses
Specialty Crops

0
0
0

0
0
0

3
0
1

2
0
0

35
0
4

115
2
23

95
8
14

95
3
9

15
1
3

Municipal
Recreation
Storage
Other

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
1
0
0

3
2
2
2

2
3
0
0

3
6
5
0

1
0
2
0

2
3
1
1

Total
0
1
15
8
69
160
135
137
26
* 1957 figures represent approximately one-half year.
** 1965 figures represent only the first six months of the year.
217. Iowa Code § 455A.20 (1962) as amended by Iowa Acts, 61st G.A. ch. 372
§ 3 (1965).
218. Iowa Acts, 61st G.A. ch. 372 § 3 (1965).
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quired in section 455A. 19 (5) and a hearing is required. Notice for
this hearing includes notice by publication as prescribed in section
455A.19 (3). The procedures followed at all hearings on applications for renewals and renewals with modifications are the same as
those used at the hearing for the original permit.
Prior to the 1965 amendment, the average length of time required to process the applications for renewal from the date the application is received by the Commission until the date the renewal is
granted has been around 70 days. When a modification was involved, the time required was slightly more. The effect of the
amendment should be to cut this time period approximately in half
for uncontested renewals. The 30-day period required for notice
is still required, however the amendment should cut out many unnecessary hearings thus making it possible for the Commissioner to
complete his determinations much more rapidly. Where the applicant is diligent in submitting his renewal application it should be
possible frequently to issue the renewal permit immediately on the
219
expiration of the preceding permit.
219. The following table shows the average time lapse between the time an application to renew or modify an existing permit was received by the Commissioner and
the time the renewal permit was ultimately granted. The 1965 figures cover only the
first six months of the year, therefore it was too early to expect any reduction in the
time delay due to the 1965 amendment providing for the possibility of renewals without
hearings. The number of permits included in each classification is shown at note 202
supra.
Table 13
Time Lapse Between Renewal Application and Permit
Use

1959*

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965**

112
NI
NI
59
NI

99
NI
NI
77
NI

58
68
35
48
25

81
NI
95
236
NI

58
NI
NI
30
NI

63
35
43
NI
51

76
NI
NI
29
NI

108
NI
30
NI
NI
NI
NI

73
NI
NI
NI
23
NI
NI

69
NI
60
47
30
22
25

78
77
63
102
158
194
31

77
47
71
54
45
NI
NI

57
114
67
55
79
55
NI

51
51
78
44
NI
38
NI

Average for all uses
92
85
59
82
72
60
+ NI means no permits were issued in this year for this use.
* No renewal or modification permits were granted during 1957 or 1958.
* 1965 figures represent only the first six months of the year.

54

Industrial
Material Production
Power Production
Food Processing
Manufacturing
Air Conditioning
Irrigation
Farms
Golf Courses
Specialty Crops
Municipal
Recreation
Storage
Other
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In cases where for one reason or another the renewal permit cannot be issued by the time the preceding permit is due to expire, the
Commissioner has the power to grant an extension of not more than
90 days to the expiring permit during the pendency of the application for renewal. 2 0 This very useful power is generously exercised
to avoid the problems of requiring another full application and
hearing.
An application to modify a permit may be submitted at any time;
it need not be associated with an application for renewal. If the modification sought involves only a decrease in the amount of water used,
221
the Commissioner may grant the application without a hearing.
All other modifications, whether involving changes in the amount,
source, diversion method, rate of withdrawal, duration or location
of the permitted use must be applied for and processed in the same
procedure as an original application.2 22 For this reason, when the
original permit is issued, the Commissioner tries to anticipate any
probable changes and make allowance for them in the permit.
E.

Termination and Suspension
All permits are continuously subject to modification and cancellation by the Commissioner. 23 Nearly all permits issued expressly advise the permittee that his permit is subject to modification and cancellation under the provisions of Iowa Code section 455A.38, however, absence of this statement either in the determination or on the
permit does not free the permittee from the operation of this provision.

A permit may be modified or canceled by the Commissioner with
the consent of the permittee, and without the permittee's consent in
case of:
(1) Any breach of the terms or conditions of the permit;
(2) Any violation of the law pertaining to the permit by the
permittee;
(3) Nonuse;
(4) Necessity to protect the public health or safety;
220. Iowa Code § 455A.20 (1962), as amended by Iowa Acts, 61st G.A. ch. 372 § 3
(1965).
221. This is more or less a policy derived from the negative inference of § 455A.20
in which a hearing is specifically required for a change in the terms of a permit effecting an "increase in quantity."
222. Iowa Code § 455A.20 (1962), as amended by Iowa Acts, 61st G.A. ch. 372 § 3
(1965).
223. Iowa Code §§ 455A.20, .28 (1962).
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(5) Necessity to protect the public interest in lands or waters;
and
(6) Necessity to prevent substantial injury to persons or property in any manner.224
In all cases where the modification or cancellation is without the permittee's consent, a hearing after a minimum of 30 days notice to
the permittee is required.
Other than consential modifications and cancellations, the only
ground of the statute invoked to date to cancel a permit has been
that dealing with breach of the terms or conditions of the permit.
Typically these situations arise when the permittee becomes delinquent in submitting required reports describing his water use.2 25
224. Iowa Code §455A.28 (1962). One provision associated with possible termination that deserves further comment is §455A.29. Although the purpose of this section
is fairly clear, the language defies comprehension. Apparently the idea is that the Commissioner is to notify a permittee whose use has ceased for three consecutive years, that
unless he applies for and receives an extension, his permit will be terminated. If such
an application is then made, the Council may grant it; if no application is forthcoming,
the permit is terminated. The situation sets out no time limits for applications for extensions and is otherwise generally unintelligible. The Commissioner has not found occasion to utilize this section-he is not sure what it means either.
225. In the following table all permits no longer in effect are classified by use according to the four possible explanations for their termination. It is readily observable
that the great majority of non-active permits were simply allowed to expire by their
holders. The number of irrigation permits that have expired is significant from the point
of view of overall potential of irrigation in Iowa. As was noted earlier, the total acreage
under irrigation permits in Iowa has remained fairly constant over the last five years.
In this same time 107 irrigation permits were permitted to expire. It is reasonable to
suppose that the onset of water shortage could easily lead to an awakening of interest
in these currently dormant potential irrigators.
Table 14
Non-Active Permits
Use
Industrial
Material Prod.
Power Production
Food Processing
Manufacturing
Air Conditioning
Irrigation
Farms
Golf Courses
Specialty Crops
Municipal
Recreation
Storage
Other
Total

Expired

Fol. Term.

Consolidated

Canceled

42
1
0
3
1

17
1
0
1
0

1
0
0
0
1

2
0
0
0
0

89
0
18
0
8
2
1
176

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
20

1
0
0
2
0
0
1
5

0
0
0
1
0
1
0
4
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As a general rule, permit holders are diligent in preparing and
submitting the necessary reports to the Water Commissioner. Failure to do so is usually attributed to either oversight or a failure on
the part of the permittee to realize that reports are necessary even
though no water has been used. In such cases, the Commissioner
sends a letter advising the permit holder of the facts and normally
the report is promptly submitted. But, if the permit holder still fails
to submit the reports after receiving notice of his delinquence the
Commissioner writes a final letter informing the permittee that a
hearing for cancellation of his permit will be held if the reports are
not forthcoming. If the reports are not then filed, the hearing is held
and the permit cancelled.226
A number of permits have been cancelled in this manner but no
appeals have been taken. It is the Commissioner's opinion that these
permit holders were not exercising their water use right and thus
were unconcerned by the cancellation of the permit.
Under the act the Commissioner also has the power to summarily
suspend a permit for a period up to 30 days if he finds it necessary in an emergency to protect the public health or safety or to
protect the public interests in lands or waters against imminent danger of substantial injury, or to protect persons or property against
such danger. In connection with an emergency the Commissioner
may also require the permittee to take such affirmative actions as
may be necessary to prevent or remedy the types of injuries described above. The Commission
exercises this power through a writ2 27
ten order to the permittee.
If the order is intended to remain in effect for more than 30
days, the permittee must be given ten days written notice and an op226. Interview with Water Commissioner Richard Bullard in Iowa City, Iowa,
March 14, 1966.
227. Iowa Code § 455A.28(3) (1962). Another interesting question associated with
the Council's power to modify and cancel permits for cause relates to water impounded
under a storage permit. Stated bluntly, the question is, could the Commissioner cancel
or modify a storage permit in time of water shortage, and thereby require the permittee
to release his stored water for the benefit of downstream users. This issue should not
be confused with the requirement commonly inserted in storage permits requiring the
release of stream inflow where necessary to prevent downstream damage. See note 157
supra. Section 455A.1 includes a definition of "Impounded or stored water" which
seems to give the impounding party absolute ownership if the water is captured pursuant
to the provisions of the act. Does this refer to all impounding and storage, or only to
unregulated activity authorized by § 455A.27? It would appear logical arguments can
be made for either position. Understandably, the Commissioner is unwilling to venture
an opinion, but it seems likely that the Council would be very reluctant to require the
owner of an impoundment, who had planned ahead for times of water scarcity, to open
his drain valves for the benefit of downstream grasshoppers.
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portunity to be heard. The hearing should be of such a nature as to
guarantee the permittee fair treatment, but a hearing of the type
held before the permit was granted is probably not required.
One question raised by the statute is whether the Commissioner
is empowered to issue more than one 30 day suspension consecutively to the same permittee. The availability of the ten day notice
procedure argues convincingly against such a practice. The Commissioner has not yet found it necessary to use this emergency power to
suspend the permit.

PART III
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
On its face the Iowa Water Act makes rather extensive alterations in the rights to the capture and use of water which existed under the common law riparian doctrine. Because of these changes, it
is perhaps inevitable that the constitutionality of the act will at some
time be called into question. Therefore, it may be helpful at this
point to review the possible constitutional principles upon which the
act might be challenged as deficient-substantive due process, procedural due process, and delegation of powers.
The Police Power and Substantive Due Process
Each state has a positive power, termed the "police power," to
make regulations in the best interests of the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. 228 The police power is exceedingly broad in
scope, encompassing regulations affecting traffic, health control, zoning, fire prevention, and conservation, to name only a few. Of course,
the state is not unlimited in its exercise of the police power. The regulations enacted under the power must be consistent with the substantive due process provisions of the state and federal constitutions.2 29
J.

228. See, e.g., Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946) ; Sinclair Ref.
Co. v. City of Chicago, 178 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Consolidated Gas Util. Corp. v.
Thompson, 14 F. Supp. 318, 326 (W. D. Texas 1936).
229. The federal constitution guarantees in the fifth amendment that no person shall
be deprived of property without due process of law and prohibits any taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V. The various
states are subject to the same limitation under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Also see, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County,
369 U.S. 84 (1962) ; Delaware, L. & W.R.R. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182, 19395 (1928) ; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
The Iowa Constitution has two relevant provisions: Article I, section 9 bars deprivation of property without due process of law and Article I, section 18 specifically provides for compensation where a public taking is exercised.
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The due process requirement is essentially a test of reasonableness. It requires that a statute be rationally related to some legitimate end of the state. The means selected must be reasonable both
in the sense that a rational legislator could believe that they could
achieve the desired end, and in the sense that they are not an unreasonable means to achieve that end. 230 For example, a legitimate

end of the state might be the elimination of typhoid fever. A rational legislator might think that that end could be achieved either
by implementing a comprehensive vaccination program, or by shooting every discovered victim of typhoid. Both means would be rationally related to the end, but only one would be reasonable. Within
these broad limits, the states have much discretion in their regulations. The means selected need not actually achieve the end in every
situation so long as it might reasonably be thought that the legislation could do so. 281 Moreover, the means selected need not be the

most reasonable means available. As the Supreme Court stated in
Williamson v. Lee Optical, "It is enough that there is an evil at hand
for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legis'2 2
lative measure was a rational way to correct it." 3
The Iowa Supreme Court agrees with the United States Supreme
Court axiom that state legislative acts deserve a strong presumption
of constitutionality. If legislation regulating economic interests is
"within the zone of doubt and fair debate" and "not clearly and
plainly prohibited by some constitutional provision," it is presumed
constitutional. 33 It is not within the judicial prerogative "to
pass
'23 4
upon the policy, wisdom, advisability or justice of a statute.

An examination of due process leaves little doubt that the state
has the constitutional power to regulate the capture and use of water. That such regulation is a legitimate end of the state goes almost
230. See, e.g., Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 226 (1952) ; Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278
U.S. 105 (1928) ; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
231. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) ; Williams v. United
States, 327 U.S. 686, 710-11 (1945).
232. 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). The court further stated: "The day is gone when this
Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state
laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought." Id. at 488.
233. Steinberg-Baum & Co. v. Countryman, 247 Iowa 923, 929, 77 N.W. 2d 15, 18
(1956). See also Benschoter v. Hakes, 232 Iowa 1354, 1364, 8 N.W. 2d 481, 487 (1943) ;
City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 1103, 184 N.W. 823, 826
(1921); Stoner McCray Sys. v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W. 2d 843
(1956).
234. Steinberg-Baum & Co. v. Countryman, 247 Iowa 923, 929, 77 N.W. 2d 155, 18
(1956).
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without saying. It is difficult if not impossible to overemphasize the
importance of water to a state and its citizens. Surely the importance
of water makes its regulation by the state as appropriate as other
types of police power regulations, such as zoning. Although the
Iowa Supreme Court has not had the occasion to hold directly on
the constitutionality of legislative interference with riparian rights,
it has spoken in favor of such regulation in a few cases. In Hatcher
v. Board of Supervisors, the plaintiff made constitutional objections
to the county's actions assessing him for drainage work approved
pursuant to a statute establishing drainage districts. In upholding
the act, the court spoke extensively of the state's right to regulate
property for the greater collective benefit of the public:
Recognizing in its fullness the individual right to the control of property held by private ownership, there accompanies that right, as a
limitation upon it, the right of government to exercise control, at
time absolute but more often abridged, but always upon the claim
that such control is necessary to subserve the public good. . . . The
court's so holding [a valid police power exercise in drainage projects]
have not recognized as the sole question that of a purpose exclusively
or essentially of public benefits in the results sought, but have proceeded upon the broader grounds that it is important to the state, to
its citizens, as a whole, as well as to individuals whose property may
thus be directly affected by charges for benefits, that all resources of
a state shall,
so far as practicable, be brought to the point of effective
2
service. 35
The significance of this language for the Iowa water statute is twofold: 1) The Iowa Supreme Court recognizes that water is an important "public" resource and therefore a proper subject of police
power regulation, and 2) the court realizes that the essence of a
police-power based regulatory scheme is not its ability to achieve a
precise balance of equity among all regulated persons, but rather, it
is to marshall the state's resources and to plan their use in a manner
calculated to maximize the public benefit on a state level.
Although, in general, it can be said that the regulation of water is
a legitimate end of the state, specific applications of the regulations
might still be constitutionally challenged. Police power regulations
have often been attacked on the ground that, as applied to the particular property in question, they constitute a "taking" of "vested
property rights" without due process, prohibited by the federal and
235. 165 Iowa 197, 201-02, 145 N.W. 12, 14 (1914).
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state constitutions." 6 Thus, in water regulation, it might be argued
that rights inherent in riparian owners under the common law have
become "vested" and that the alteration or termination of these
vested rights through the enactment of a water statute violates due
2 T
process.
The vested rights argument seems misleading in several respects.
In the first place riparian rights are "property" only in a very limited sense. The common law riparian owner had no property rights
in the water in a stream, but only a restricted right to use it. This
right was subject to similar rights in all other riparian owners on the
watercourse, as well as to a considerable number of federal and state
238
powers.
Perhaps an even more serious objection to the "vested rights"
argument is that the term would seem to be meaningless. Whether
or not a particular right is termed "vested" sheds very little light on
whether the state can constitutionally take it. Even the most faultless of property rights can be taken for a public purpose through the
eminent domain power, accompanied by appropriate compensation.2" 9 Thus, the real question arising from water legislation is not
the ability to take, but whether the owner must be compensated for
the taking. The term "vested" is merely a label attached by courts
to interests they deem worthy of protection under the facts of a
particular case.
The cases reveal a tendency to require compensation in those situations where government action is direct and is aimed at a specific
party or a specific piece of property. Thus, compensation was
awarded where the federal government condemned a dam,240 requisitioned all the electric power produced by a particular power
236. See e.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co., 318 U.S. 163 (1943) ;
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); United States v. Tilley, 124
F.2d 850, 861 (8th Cir. 1942).
237. See McCord v. High, 24 Iowa 336, 342 (1868) where the court says: "The right
which the owner of lands has to a water-course flowing over them . . . cannot be
taken from him constitutionally for public use without just compensation."
238. See generally, Willis v. City of Perry, 92 Iowa 297, 301-02, 60 N.W. 727, 728
(1894). T. Lauer, The Riparian Right as Property, in Legislative Research Center,
Univ. of Mich. Law School, Water Resources and the Law, 131, 133-268 (1958) ; O'Connell, Iow.a's New Water Statute-The Constitutionally of Regulating Existing Uses of
Water, 47 Iowa L. Rev. 549, 581-94 (1962).
239. See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court ExpropriationLaw, in 1962 The Supreme Court Review 63, 65-71 and
cases cited therein.
240. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 345 (1893).
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company,"' or revoked the easements of a particular railroad.2 42
However, where a demonstrable injury results indirectly from an
exercise of governmental powers, the courts are less likely to require
compensation. 43 Compensation has been denied, for example, for
consequential damages arising from a readjustment of a regulatory
244
scheme, such as a modification of regulations for optical appliance
245
or rental regulations.
In Higgins v. Board of Supervisors, the
Iowa Supreme Court made its position quite clear in this respect:
Acts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers [in this case
the police power], and not directly encroaching upon private property, though their consequences may impair its use, are universally
held not to be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provision.

246

While in general consequential damages arising from government
regulations do not require compensation, this is not always the case.
Sometimes the damage to the individual is so great, even though it
arises only indirectly and from a perfectly proper exercise of regulatory power, that courts will require compensation. The test used to
determine whether a particular injury is compensable is essentially
one of fairness. As such, the outcome of the test will depend heavily
upon the peculiar facts of the case under consideration. Compensation will be awarded if, after considering all the facts, the court decides the public benefit achieved by the regulation is outweighed by
the amount of injury to the plaintiff.2 4 7 An example is the United
States Supreme Court case of Griggs v. Allegheny County.2 4 That
case involved landing routines established for commercial jet aircraft by the United States Civil Aeronautics Administration at the
Greater Pittsburgh Airport. The landing routine resulted in so
241. International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931).
242. Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165 (1893).
243. See Dunham, supra note 239, at 73-90 and cases cited therein.
244. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
245. In Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100 (1947), the Supreme Court, in preventing
enforcement of an eviction order of the state court rendered before the enabling legislation was enacted, rejected the contention that vested rights were taken without due
process when the application of certain rent regulations were sustained. The Court
stated, "So long as the Constitution authorizes the subsequently enacted legislation, the
fact that its provisions limit or interfere with previously acquired rights does not condemn it." Id. at 107.
246. 188 Iowa 448, 457, 176 N.W. 268, 271 (1920).
247. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922).
248. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
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many low-altitude jet flights over plaintiff's property as to render
that property unusable for practically any purpose. The court held
that this was a taking worthy of compensation.
One can only speculate as to what result will be reached in litigation involving the Iowa Water Act. However, the uncompensated
alteration of riparian rights is not without precedent. For example,
in Gibson v. United States, 249 the Supreme Court held that the consequential interference with riparian rights resulting from the improvement of a navigable river was not a taking requiring compensation. Moreover, in United States v. Commodore Park, Inc.,250 the
court upheld government action changing the course of a stream to
improve navigation, thereby cutting off completely the riparian's access to the watercourse. Damages have been awarded, however,
when overflow from a government dam deprived the agricultural
land in back of the dam of all value.2 51
State courts likewise have denied compensation in upholding state
action. A recent decision by the Ohio Supreme Court held no compensation was due plaintiff, a marine terminal operator, when the
state highway commission built a bridge which substantially impaired traffic to and from his terminal. 2 52 The Supreme Court of
Louisiana held that where oyster beds were destroyed by dredging
operations of a state agency, the lessees of such beds were not entitled to compensation for an "appropriation" of private property
under the Louisiana Constitution.2 53
A group of Iowa cases speak of "vested rights," which, although
they concern zoning and building regulations, could influence the
Iowa Supreme Court if and when the vested rights question comes
up concerning the Iowa water statute. It is probably most accurate
to characterize their facts as situations where individuals have relied
to their financial detriment on building and zoning permits that were
subsequently revoked because they were erroneously issued.
In Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co.,254 defendant received a
permit to build a gas station on a lot zoned residential. Before the
permit was rescinded, the defendant had contracted to buy the land
and to build the gas station and had placed some construction materials on the lot. Nevertheless, the Iowa Supreme Court held that
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

166 U.S. 269 (1897).
324 U.S. 386 (1945).
United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
State ex rel. Anderson v. Preston, 2 Ohio App. 2d 244, 207 N.E. 2d 664 (1963).
Marie v. Police Jury, 161 So. 2d 407 (La. App. 1964).
193 Iowa 1096, 184 N.W. 823 (1921).
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since title to the land had not yet passed nor had any construction
commenced, defendant's reliance was insufficient to establish a vested
right. Language later in the opinion, however, suggests the real rationale for the decision was that, although the defendant perhaps
had some property rights, they should be regulated to this extent
because of the police power policy behind the zoning scheme.
Call Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Sioux City255 involved similar facts

with a commercial green house in a residential zone. The only reliance in this case was that the plaintiff met a Mr. Mahoney on the
street and orally ordered five thousand bricks-no price was set, no
delivery was made, nor was there performance of any kind by either
party. The issue of the existence of "vested rights" here was not in
constitutional terms as it was in Manhattan Oil, but the court did
hold there were not vested property rights.
The Iowa court found a vested right in Crow v. Board of Adjustment,25 6 where the appellant proceeded to construct a combination

apartment-animal clinic in a residential zone, relying on a building
permit and an erroneous legal opinion from the Iowa City City Attorney. The court emphasized that "due to the change in status quo
during this period, Dr. Crow secured a vested right to proceed under
the building permit as issued." Stoner McCray System v. Des
Moines,25 7 approached on the due process level the question whether

an ordinance which interferes with rights in existing billboards
amounts to an impairment of vested rights. The court held there
was an unconstitutional taking in regard to the existing billboards;
but they stated that the "regulation" (barring) of future billboards
is a valid exercise of the state's police power, thus expressing the
dichotomy of existing versus future rights which was only implied in
the above cases. The most recent of these cases, Board of Supervisors
v. Paaske,2 5 s involved a real estate entrepreneur who purchased five
houses, acquired permits to move them, dug basements, laid concrete
255. 219 Iowa 572, 259 N.W. 33 (1935).
256. 227 Iowa 324, 288 N.W. 145 (1939).
257. 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W. 2d 843 (1956). In dictum the court stated:
We do not wish to infer herein that under certain circumstances a municipality
could not provide for the termination of nonconforming uses, especially if the
period of amortization of the investment was just and reasonable, and the
present use was a course of danger to the public health, morals, safety or general welfare of those who have come to be occupants of the surrounding territory. Id. at 1319-20.
There is a question whether this would apply to any alterations of water rights under
the Iowa Act since this dictum appears to apply only to non-conforming uses.
258. 250 Iowa 1293, 98 N.W. 2d 827 (1959).
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footings, contracted to have foundations laid, and placed construction materials on his 2.4 acre tract, only to be confronted with a
subsequently enacted zoning ordinance requiring at least a one acre
lot per house. The court had no difficulty in finding that the plaintiff
had "relied" to the point that his rights should be considered vested.
Although the exact portent of these cases for the Iowa water
statute is unclear, it is obvious that they represent some of the Iowa
Supreme Court's thinking about the nature of vested rights in general. In the first place, a finding or not of vested property rights depends to a great extent on the particular facts of each situation.
Next, the court is concerned with detrimental financial reliance-do
the facts stack up to show such reliance? In the three cases that
found vested rights, there was a substantial investment irrevocably
committed to the claimant's project. The Stoner case approached
this reliance aspect in terms of existing versus nonexisting billboards,
and probably did so because this was the distinction expressed by the
ordinance. Although unexpressed in other cases, this existing-nonexisting analysis is implicit in their rationale, and thus all of these
cases may present a cluster of authority which might be regarded
as threatening the ability of the Iowa water act to adversely affect
uses of water existing at the time the act was adopted, without
providing damages to the owners of such rights.
Since the Iowa act has never operated during a period of water
shortage, it is difficult to predict under what circumstances a constitutional challenge might arise. At the present time the most likely
complainant would seem to be the irrigator. The irrigator is the
primary consumptive user of water. Therefore, he is the one most
likely to be adversely affected by the minimum flow restriction. The
typical irrigator would probably not have a valid constitutional claim.
He is required to obtain a permit and to pay a fee for it, but this
would not seem to be a substantial deprivation. His permit states
a limit of the amount of water he can take, but at the present time
the limits are set sufficiently high that he can probably take all he
can use. Indeed, so long as the water in the watercourse remains
above the minimum flow the irrigator would not seem to be in any
worse position than he was under the common law.
Even when the minimum flow is reached and no further water can
be taken, the irrigator is adversely affected by the act only to the
extent that the established minimum flow exceeds the point at
which he would have been denied further access to the watercourse
under the "reasonable use" theory of the riparian rights doctrine.
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It is very doubtful that this relatively minor imposition is sufficient
to outweigh the benefit derived by the public from the guarantee
of a certain minimum flow in Iowa streams.
While the typical user of water would probably have no valid
complaint, a possibility exists that the act might be held unconstitutional as applied to individuals who can show special circumstances.
For example, an irrigator who, at considerable expense, built pumps
capable of withdrawing from a stream enough water to raise a specialized crop needing much more water than normal Iowa crops,
might claim an analogy between his position and that of the complainants in the zoning and building regulations cases discussed
above. However, to do so it would be necessary to show that his substantial financial outlay was in reasonable reliance on the riparian
law existing before the Iowa act was passed. Given the uncertainties inherent in the riparian system of water rights, reasonable reliance on any right claimed under the former law will be extremely
difficult to show. Therefore, except for the possibility of a few extraordinary circumstances, it is doubtful that there can be successful
constitutional attacks upon the Iowa act on the grounds that it is
violative of substantive due process.
Nevertheless, because the fear of unconstitutionality is a cloud
that seems always to cast its shadow on regulation of this species, 259
there is considerable merit in the idea of amending the act by adding
to it a statute of limitation-type curative provision. In essence, such a
provision should require all persons claiming rights to use Iowa
waters as the result of interests acquired prior to the effective date
of the act to file their claims with the Commissioner before a certain
date or the right to enforce their claims will become barred. If the
period allowed for filing is adequately long, such a provision should
effectively erase the possibility of the act as administered being held
260 Of
to have unconstitutionally purported to destroy valid rights.
259. See C. Fisher, Due Process and the Effect of Eastern Appropriation Proposals
on Existing Rights, With Special Emphasis on the Michigan Proposel, in The Law of
Water Allocation in the Eastern United States 441 (D. Haber and S. Bergen eds. 1958) ;
T. Lauer, The Riparian Right as Property, in Legislative Research Center, Univ. Mich.
Law School, Water Resources and the Law 131, 133-36 (1958) ; O'Connell, supra
note 238, at 581.
260. See Lauer, supra note 238, at 264-68. An example of statutory limitation on
existing uses can be found in § 303 and § 304 of the Model Water Use Act. The drafter's comments to these sections suggest that they should satisfy constitutional requirements.
"Section 303. [Preservation of Existing Uses]
Alternate 1
[(a) The withdrawal of water directly from any contained or ground water source,
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course any claims filed within the period would have to be closely
examined and if a meritorious claim turned up it would have to be
recognized, but it is likely that not many such rights would be
claimed, and that fewer could be substantiated.
B.

Adequacy of ProceduralSafeguards
As a matter of fundamental fairness a person whose rights may
be adversely affected by the action of an administrative agency
should be afforded the opportunity to appear before the agency and
present his case. 261 This principle is most honored where the agency
an application of water for the production of power, or an impounding by any dam,
waterway obstruction, or reservoir of any contained water, which is a lawful and
beneficial use, other than a domestic use, (1) being made at the effective date of this
Act, (2) to be made in conjunction with facilities under construction at the effective
date of this Act, or (3) made within the [three] years prior thereto, may be continued
if the user complies with the provisions of section 304.]
Section 304. [Certification of Existing Uses.]
(a) Within [three] years after the effective date of this Act, the Commission shall
require by rule any person making a use preserved under section 303 (a) to file a declaration of his use with the Commission within [three] months after the effective date
of the rule. In its rules requiring the filing of declarations of existing uses, the Commission may divide the State into areas and prescribe different date for filings from
the various areas.
(b) Any person making a use preserved under section 303 (a) may file a declaration
of his use with the Commission at any time.
(c) (1) When the Commission requires filings of declarations of uses by rule, it
shall cause notice of the rule to be given by publication [once each week for the three
weeks prior to the effective date of the rule] in a newspaper of general distribution in
the affected areas.
(2) The Commission shall also cause notice of the rule to be given by registered or
-ertified mail to any person required to file of whom the Commission has or could
readily obtain knowledge or who has requested mailed notice to be given when the
Commission adopted a rule requiring the filing or declarations.
(d) The declaration shall be in such form and contain such information as the
Commission by rule prescribes including the quantity of water used, the purpose or
manner of the use, the time of taking the water, and the point of diversion of the water.
[(e) If no declaration is filed as required by rule of the Commission, the Commission shall conclusively determine the extent of the uses preserved under section 303 (a).]
(f) If the Commission has not acted upon a declaration within [90] days after its
filing, the Commission shall certify those uses described in the declaration.
(g) When uses preserved have been ascertained in accordance with the provisions
of this section, the Commission shall issue a certificate describing those uses.
(h) The Commission shall hold a hearing upon the request of any person adversely
affected by the certification or the refusal to certify any water use."
261. Mr. Justice Douglas once stated the proposition in these terms. "It is not without significance that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance that
there will be equal justice under law." Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951). For a comprehensive discussion of the necessity of hearings
in the administration process see 1 K. Davis, Administration Law § 7 (1958).
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is adjudicating a case in which the person's rights are directly involved. The Iowa permit statute is an example of the general practice as it spells out in detail the hearing procedures afforded to an
applicant for a permit, and requires hearing in connection with the
cancellation or modification of a permit. It is generally recognized
that certain procedural guarantees may be forgone in times of
emergency. Also, where the agency is engaged in rule making (legislative) activity it is generally held that members of the general
class of parties to be affected need not be provided a hearing, although in many instances these parties are invited to present their
62
views.1

The difficult procedural problem presented by the Iowa statute in
this area concerns the participation of third parties in the hearing
concerning issuance, modification or cancellation of a permit. Without question, any person interested in the outcome of the hearing
may appear and support or oppose the issuance modification or cancellation of a permit offering both evidence and arguments. In the
early days of administering the Iowa statute such appearances were
commonplace. Whether such persons are entitled to any personal
notice of the hearings admits of great uncertainties, however.
Under modern constitutional notions of procedural due process, a
person whose rights may be adversely affected by any proceeding to
which finality is to be accorded is entitled to a notice of such proceeding in a manner reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise the interested person of the pendency of action and to
afford him an opportunity to present his objections. In evaluating
the adequacy of the Iowa notice provisions vis-a-vis third parties,
three elements must be considered: ( 1) The nature of the interests
of "affected" third parties, (2) the "finality" of the determination
awarding the permit, and (3) the reasonableness of the notice provisions.
1. Third Party Rights
As an initial proposition, it would seem that the granting of a
permit to use Iowa waters may affect rights of persons other than the
particular permittee involved. Under the statute the grant of a permit is conditioned on the Water Commission's finding that the
proposed withdrawal is not detrimental "to the interests of property
owners with prior or superior rights who might be affected. ' 26 3 As
262. See 1 Cooper, State Administration Law 173-208 (1965), 1 K. Davis, id., § 7.08.
263. Io'wa Code §455A.20 (1962).
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administered this limitation is rendered somewhat nugatory, yet it
suggests that the legislature contemplated that the property interests of third persons might be affected by the issuance of a permit to
any particular applicant.
More to the point might be the interest of an irrigator, already
holding a permit, in the granting of a permit to another irrigation
use in the same reach of the stream. Under the summation flow
doctrine utilized by the Water Commissioner each irrigation use
permitted on a stream reach raises proportionally the level of stream
flow that must exist before any irrigator may draw water from the
stream without an approved sharing agreement.26 4 The granting of a
new permit, therefore, could be said to reduce in some measure the
quantum of water rights held by existing permittees. Although it is
impossible to predict with certainty whether the courts would regard such third party rights as of a substantial enough nature to
require that they be adequately notified of the hearing, in a proper
case the likelihood of such a result must be recognized.
2.

Finality of the Hearing
Before it can be said that third parties must be notified of hearings
that might affect their water rights, it must be determined that such
"
hearings can have a substantial adverse effect on such rights. 2 65
Under the Iowa scheme, it might be suggested that third parties
rights are not adversely affected because the proceeding through
which a permit is issued lacks finality. This argument is premised
on section 455A.28 which provides: "Subject to appeal in the manner provided by section 455A.19, subsection 8, a permit may . . .
in case the water commission finds such modification or cancellation
necessary to protect the public health or safety, or to protect the
public interests in lands or waters, or to prevent substantial injury
to persons or property in any manner .

.

.

."

Under this provision

it would seem that the question of the grounds for issuance of a
permit is always open and that at any time subsequent to the granting of the permit, these matters may be re-opened and re-examined.
On the other hand, the statute provides no procedure for an interested third party to initiate a review of the grounds for continuation of a particular permit except the regular appeal provisions,
which are useful only to the extent that the third party is made aware
264. See discussion accompanying footnotes 151-73 supra.
265. See 1 Cooper, supra note 262, at 135-59; Oberst, Parties to Administrative

Proceedings, 40 Mich. L. Rev. 378 (1941).
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of the hearing result in time to file an appeal. Therefore, it would
seem that in many cases the third party who did not know about the
permit application considered at the hearing would have no direct
procedure to call in question the "substantial injury" to his rights,
but would have to depend on the water commissioner to exercise his
discretion and call for a hearing on the issue of cancellation or
modification. Such a restricted method for later raising his rights
seems considerably less protection for third parties than what could
be provided by notifying them of the hearing in the first instance.
Further, it could be argued that any damage that might occur between the granting of the permit and a later cancellation is not
remedied by a modification provided in the section authorizing
such cancellations. On the whole, it would seem that the proceeding
through which a water permit is granted partakes of sufficient finality as to third parties as to raise a procedural due process question
if the notice of the hearing is not adequate.
3. Reasonableness of the Notice
Thus, we come down to the crucial question-the adequacy, as to
third parties, of the notice provisions in the water statute. The test
for adequate notice has been stated thusly: "The reasonableness and
hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform
those affected . . . or, where conditions do not reasonably permit
such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to
bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substi266
tutes."
Under the Iowa Act the notice requirements are specified in detail. Upon application for a permit to use water under the Iowa Act,
the Water Commissioner shall cause due notice of a hearing thereon
to be published once a week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in each county in which the property
affected is located. 6 7 This publication must be within thirty days, but
not less than ten days, of the hearing date.2 68 The statement "shall
specify the date, time and place of hearing and shall include a concise
statement of the designated beneficial purposes for which diversion
266. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
This case is universally recognized as the touchstone for almost all due process notice
questions.
267. Iowa Code § 455A.1 (1962) as amended by Iowa Acts, 61st G.A. ch. 372 § 1
(1965).
268. Ibid.
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is sought, the specific limits as to quantity, time, place, and rate of
diversion, storage or withdrawal of waters, the name of the applicant and the description of the land upon which waters are to be
diverted, stored or withdrawn." In addition, provision is made that
such notice must be sent to interested state agencies," and to any
other person who has filed a written request for a notification of any
hearings affecting a designated area. .. .
Considering that a water user may be affected by a permitted use
miles upstream and perhaps in a different county, can it be said with
assurance that the notice provided for in the Iowa act is reasonably
calculated to actually apprise all interested parties of the pendency
of a permit application hearing? 270 Four related issues are raised by
this queston: ( 1 ) the necessity for some type of personalized notice
to interested third parties; (2) the sufficiency of the Iowa publication requirements if it is determined that general notice may be adequate; (3) the effect of permitting interested parties to file requests
for hearing; and (4) the possible curative effect of giving better
notice than the statute requires.
(1) The constitutional requirements for due process notice laid
down in the Mullane case have been further developed in recent
years. An examination of several of the important cases should shed
some light on the question of the sufficiency of the Iowa act's notice
provisions.
Walker v. City of Hutchinson,27 ' involved a condemnation proceeding brought by an administrative agency regulating private
property for the public benefit. Under the statutes of Kansas notice
could be given by publication "in the official city paper," and it was
so done even though the plaintiff's name and address could have been
ascertained from the official city records. The court held that because
his name could have been easily ascertained, conditions reasonably
required direct written notice, and the failure to so provide was a
violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In
discussing the Mullane principles, the court emphasized the significance of the particular factual situation:
269. Io'wa Code §455A.19(3) (1962).
270. From the statutory syntax it seems clear that "property affected" in §455A.1
refers to the property on which the permitted use is to be made and not other property
that may be affected by granting of the permitted use. One way around the notice problem discussed subsequently might be to strain the statutory language to obtain the latter
interpretation.
271. 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
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We there called attention to the impossibility of setting up a rigid
formula as to the kind of notice that must be given; notice required
will vary with the circumstances and conditions. .

.

. In the present

case there seems to be no compelling or even persuasive reasons why
such direct notice cannot be given. Appellant's name was known to the
city and was on the official records. Even a letter would have apprised
him that his property was about to be 272
taken and that he must appear
if he wanted to be heard as to its value.

Recently the court passed on the constitutionality of a statute
dealing with condemnation of riparian rights which provided for
notice by newspaper publication and the posting of handbills. 27 s The
plaintiff failed to make a timely application for compensation for the
taking of her riparian rights. The provision in issue required notice
by publication in two specified New York City papers and two papers
in the county where the property was located, once a week for six
consecutive weeks. Also handbills were to be posted simultaneously
along affected watercourses at appropriate intervals. The court
found actual compliance with these requirements. The plaintiff
asserted that the requirements of Mullane and Walker were not met
by this statute because she used the property only in the summer and
thus the provisions were not likely to give her notice. The Supreme

Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals holding that in the
circumstances, the newspaper publications and posted notices did
not measure up to the quality of due process required by Mullane
and Walker. The crucial factor seemed to be that her name and
address could have been easily discovered from the public records
and that she did not actually see the newspaper notice, nor was any
handbill posted on her property.
Closer to the issue under study is the decision of the Federal
District Court in Baumann v. Smrha,274 holding that the Kansas
Water Act was not constitutionally defective for its failure to provide for notice to affected parties for a permit hearing. However,
the rationale for this decision seemed to rest on the ground that the
Kansas permits are necessarily granted subject to valid existing
vested rights and to prior appropriations, and provision for the pro272. Id. at 115-16.
273. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962). The plaintiff's complaint
alleged damages based on impairment of her riparian rights relating to bathing, swimming, fishing and boating due to the diminution in the velocity of flow in the river.
274. 145 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1956).
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tection of those rights, either by actions for damages or injunction,
is carefully made by the act. The court seemed to be saying in effect
that no notice issue was presented because no third party's rights
can be affected by the hearing. As discussed earlier, this conclusion is
not so easily reached under the Iowa statute.
The adequacy of the Iowa notice procedures is very difficult to
evaluate under the emerging due process standards. The cases
seem to say that if the party raising the issue has an interest in the
nature of a property right, he must be given some sort of personalized notice if his identity is known or can be discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence. Thus, it would seem to follow that
where the identity of other permittees and existing nonregulated
water users likely to be affected by an action in regard to a particular permit are known to the Water Commissioner, due process requires better service than a two-time publication. On the other hand,
the cases developing this doctrine involve parties whose rights were
clearly and directly affected by the action taken, not third parties, the
nature of whose rights border on the speculative. It should be noted
in this regard that the Iowa court has in the past attempted to distinguish between substantial and speculative interests in applying the
2 75
Mullane standards.
A modification of the approach adopted by the court in the
Baumann case considering the Kansas provision might provide
something of a compromise answer. It is very difficult to take the
position that third parties are entitled to no notice because their
rights can in no way be affected by the hearing. But, because the
Iowa permits are always subject to review and the rights of third
parties are therefore never completely cut off, perhaps it is reasonable for Iowa to take the position that, although notice of hearings
concerning permits should be provided for interested third parties, a
general notice reasonably likely to apprise such parties of the action
will suffice, even in cases where better notice might readily have been
given. Whether this rationale will weather the test of litigation, only
275. See In re Estate of Pierce, 245 Iowa 22, 27, 60 N.W.2d 894, 898 (1953) where
the court said in connection to the right of a will contestant to receive personal notice
of the admission of the will, "These objectors . . . only interest in the estate was contingent upon a successful contest of the will . . ." and then quoted from the Mullane
decision the passage, "Nor do we consider it unreasonable for the State to dispense with
more certain notice to those beneficiaries whose interests are either conjectural or
future."
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time will tell;
however, it does have a certain practical appeal to
2 76
commend it.

(2) Assuming for the moment the validity of the foregoing rationale, can it be said that the Iowa provisions provide adequate
general notice ? The statute provides for publication of the notice for
two weeks in the county in which the property affected is located. Is
this reasonably calculated to apprise of the hearing a water user on
the same reach of the stream, but in a different county? Ought not
notice be published in every county in which an affected user might be
located? The answers to these questions are not readily apparent
from the case authorities. A certain common sense efficiency and
expediency suggest that it might be nigh to impossible to determine
the full range of effect of any particular water use. Still, to the extent
it can readily be determined that effects are likely to cross county
lines it would seem reasonable to require notice in the other counties.
Although by no means conclusive on the question, the rules and
practices of other administrative agencies with regard to published
general notice are suggestive of the result a court might reach on this
question. A federal agency somewhat analogous in activity to the
Water Commissioner is the Federal Communications Commission.
The F.C.C., in allocating licenses for radio and television stations,
regulates a resource-the air waves-not unlike water in many of
its characteristics. The F.C.C. issues and modifies communication
licenses after a hearing on the matter at which competitors of the
applicant may appear and present objections. The F.C.C. rules provide for only a publication type notice of such hearings, and only in
the city in which the facility in issue is located. Although the licenses
at issue are prized considerably higher then water permits, no question has ever been raised concerning the sufficiency of such notice.2 77
Insofar as they purport to provide general notice, the Iowa pro276. It is likely that the notice provisions will stand a fair chance of being sustained
by the Iowa Supreme Court under the doctrine of the Pierce case cited in note 275
supra. In federal court the outlook may not be so good, See 1 Cooper, supra note, at 277.
277. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.580(c) (1966). Admittedly this is a weak argument for supporting the validity of the Iowa notice provision, but the weakness lies less in the analogy than in the circumstance that the F.C.C. rules have never been questioned. Signals
from radio or T.V. transmitters in a particular city can affect stations in nearby cities
in much the same way that withdrawal of water at one location can affect uses some
distance downstream. The absence of challenge in a competitive business like communications might indicate the acceptability of the notion that requiring anything more
than general published notice at the site of the proposed facility would be highly unpractical.
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visions are at best minimally adequate. As a matter of sound policy,
notice should be published where it is likely to reach persons whose
interests may be affected, even if outside the county of the proposed
use.
(3) If the notice provisions are found inadequate in a particular
case on either of the grounds discussed above, it is extremely unlikely
that the opportunity to request notice27 provided in the act will
cure the deficiencies. The very persons for whose benefit the notice
requirements are created are those unlikely to know of the proceeding other than by receiving adequate notice at the time it is held.
It makes little sense to suggest that because they had a right to file a
request to receive notice if a proceeding of a certain kind were ever
held, by not filing such a request they rendered themselves undeserving of adequate notice when the event occurred. 9
(4) One final possibility for sustaining the adequacy of the notice
provisions deserves mention. Suppose the Water Commissioner
affords better notice to interested parties than the statute requires,
i.e., he mails notice of hearings to all parties known to be interested.
Is the sufficiency of the notice to be judged by the notice in fact
received by interested parties or by the notice provided for by the
statute ?
A formidable body of older authority substantiates the proposition that to be effective notice must be "legal", that is, it must comply
with the terms of the statute under which it is given.28 0 Under this
theory, notice beyond the requirements of the relevant statutory
provisions is extralegal and of no effect. Therefore, the argument
runs, such notice would be ineffective to cure the constitutional deficiencies of the statute.
Arrayed against this ancient learning is the modern constitutional
law concept of standing. The standing doctrine is concerned with the
ability of a particular party to challenge the constitutionality of a
procedure and is premised on notion that constitutional questions
should not be determined unless the claimant raising
the issue can
28 1
show some injury as a result of the alleged invalidity.
Applying this thinking, a party who in fact received constitutionally adequate notice, or had actual knowledge of a proceeding, could
not complain that the statutory notice requirements were deficient.
278. Iowa Code §455A.19(3) (1962).
279. See generally on waiver of notice, 1 Cooper, supra note 262, at 278.
280. See Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) ; Boivin v. Talcott, 102 F. Supp.
979 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
281. See generally 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 22.01 et seq. (1958).
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As yet, Iowa courts have not been faced with the necessity to choose
between the "legal notice" and "standing" approaches to the due
process notice problem. When the issue is faced the "standing"
theory will probably hold sway. Hopefully, the water permit procedures will not furnish the occasion for this test.
C.

ImproperDelegation of Powers
Perhaps the stiffest challenge the water permit law faces in the
constitutional area relates the possible improper delegation of legislative powers to the Council. State courts, generally, and the Iowa
court in particular, have been extremely vigilant in protecting the
282
balance of powers between the several branches of government.
This concern that the various departments of government not overreach one another is expressed in Article III, Section 1 of the Iowa
Constitution: "[N]o person charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any
function appertaining to either of the others ...
"
Receiving the closest scrutiny in Iowa are attempts by the legislature to confer on an administrative agency decision making powers
requiring legislative-type judgment. Although the Iowa court has
addressed itself frequently to the improper delegation issue, no
clear pattern of approach has yet emerged. Iowa's handling of the
delegation of powers issue depends heavily on the type of situation
before the court. In almost all cases a balancing process is utilized,
weighing the public interest against the danger to rights intended to
be protected through the separation of powers concept. Where the
public interest is highest, as in matters of health and safety, a proper
delegation is usually found. Where the public interest is less and
the threat to important rights is substantial, the likelihood is greater
for finding an excess delegation. Where the scale is more or less in
equilibrium, the presence or absence of several factors may cause
the balance to be struck one way or the other. In passing, it should
be noted that the state of the Iowa law on the issue of legislative
delegation is very similar to that of most other jurisdictions.2 83 The
federal cases
are much more liberal, though not terribly better
8 4
reasoned.

2

282. See 1 Cooper, supra note 262, at 31-94 (1965) ; Lewis Consolidated School Dist.
v. Johnson, 256 Iowa 236, 127 N.W.2d 118 (1964).
283. See 1 Cooper, id., 1 K. Davis, supra note 261, §§ 2.07-.16.
284. See 1 K. Davis, supra note 261, §§ 2.01-.06. The traditionally liberal Federal approach to undue delegation problems has been extended to new heights in the recent
interstate water apportionment case, .Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), decree
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The delegation of a power to an administrative agency will not be
struck down solely because the power delegated is legislative in its
nature. Powers of a type ordinarily exercised by the legislature may
be delegated under circumstances where the necessity for such delegation may be readily perceived." 5 This statement is most likely to
hold true where the function to be performed lies in the area of
public health, safety or morals. 2 8

'

For example, the Iowa court has

approved the delegation of authority to local health boards to discover and remedy any "nuisance, source of filth or cause of sickness"
found on private premises in the community, including the power to
prescribe necessary health rules.287 The court pointed out that in
absence of such a delegation of power the enforcement of acts involving public health would be ineffective.
Similarily, in the recent case of Danner v. Hass, 28 8 the Iowa
court sustained the validity of a statute authorizing the State Department of Public Safety to suspend, without preliminary hearing,
the license of an operator who has committed a "serious" violation
of the motor vehicle laws. The plaintiff challenged the suspension of
his license on the ground that the term "serious violation" was so
vague a standard as to constitute an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the public safety department. The court noted
that the question was not free from difficulty, but went on to state
that the "trend of authority is to uphold a considerable vesting of
discretion in the department for the purpose of promoting public
safety."
entered 376 U.S. 340 (1964). The majority rejected guidance from the traditionally
applied equitable apportionment doctrine, and upheld the language of the statute as
providing an adequate standard for the allocation of Colorado River waters to the
contending states. The majority apparently was untroubled by the literal absence of
any standard as they explained, "while the Secretary must follow the standards [broad
limits] set out in the Act, he nevertheless is free to choose among the recognized methods
of apportionment or to devise reasonable methods of his o'wn."
285. See Davis, id. §§ 2.07-.10; In McLeland v. Marshall County, 199 Iowa 1232,
1238, 201 N.W. 401, 403 (1924) the court said,
The exact line of demarcation between legislative power and administrative
duties in some cases is not easily determinable. It may be stated, in a general
way, that it is for the legislature to determine what the law shall be, to create
rights and duties, and provide a rule of conduct. This does not necessarily
mean that the legislature must lay down a strict rule that must be followed
by an administrative officer, but that an executive or commission may be vested
by the legislative branch of the government with discretion; within certain
limits, in carrying out the provisions of a statute.
286. See 1 Cooper, supra note 262, 85-87 and cases cited therein.
287. State v. Strayer, 230 Iowa 1027, 299 N.W. 912 (1941).
288. 257 Iowa 654, 134 N.W.2d 534 (1965). See also Broadlay v. Sioux City, 229
Iowa 1291, 291 N.W. 171 (1940).
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Where the public interest in the regulatory activity carried on by
the administrative agency is not large, but the possible prejudice to
private rights involved is substantial, the delegation of power must
be spelled out in sufficient detail that the administrative officer has
relatively clear guidelines in which he must operate. For example,
where the city of Des Moines by ordinance delegated to its board of
zoning adjustments the power to authorize a permit to occupy a
stockyard after receiving certain fire and health reports, the court
found such ordinance completely devoid of guides or standards,
conferring on the board "virtually unlimited power . . . to authorize or not authorize a permit .... 289

Even where the public interest is substantial, a strong possibility
for deprivation of individual rights may cause the courts to require
clear legislative standards. For example, where the state highway
commission was authorized to establish regulations governing the
use of highways, the violation of which would constitute misdemeanors, the court found an unlawful delegation of power owing to
the absence of any real standards to guide the agency in formulating
its rules.2 90
In circumstances in which the public interest in the activity regulated is substantial but less critical than matters touching on safety
and health and no great threat to private rights is apparent, it is very
difficult to predict how the court will resolve the adequacy of the
standards provided to guide administrative decisions. One factor
recognized in Iowa in such cases is the need for relatively broad
standards where a particularly complicated activity is being regulated to permit the administrative agency's expertise to be utilized.
In Miller v. Schuster,29 ' the court approved a grant of power to the
State Banking Board authorizing them to fix maximum interest
rates for small loans in an amount "as will induce efficiently managed
commercial capital to enter such business in sufficient amount to
make available adequate credit facilities to individuals without the
security or financial responsibility usually required by commercial
banks." The court explained its holding on the basis of a long standing "common sense" policy through which due regard is given to the
difficulty of adapting legislation to complex conditions.
However, the difficulty of legislating effective standards does not
289. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Liddle, 253 Iowa 402, 408, 112 N.W.2d
852, 855 (1962).
290. Goodlove v. Logan, 217 Iowa 98, 251 N.W. 39 (1933).
291. 227 Iowa 1005, 289 N.W. 702 (1940), commented on in 25 Iowa L. Rev. 812
(1940).
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excuse the failure to specify any standards whatsoever where it is
clear some standards could be formulated. In an important recent
case the court struck down the grant of power to the state superintendent of public instruction to "formulate standards, regulations
and rules . . . for the approval of the schools and public junior
colleges under his supervision" and to enforce such rules by removing
from his approved list schools which he finds do not comply with
them.29 2 The statute in question contained no provisions expressly
bridling the superintendent's exercise of this discretion in these
matters. As the court put it, the statute seems "to give the superintendent, with the approval of the department, unlimited authority to
do whatever he deems best in furthering the educational interests
of the state." The court continued by recognizing that the modern
trend is to require less exactness in the setting of legislative standards, but held "where standards or guidelines are readily possible,
we think the legislature may not abandon them altogether. ..."
Other factors that may play a role in the outcome of cases of
this type are the extent to which the regulatory action is penal in
nature, the degree to which the separation of powers principle is
compromised, the extent to which regulation of the type at issue is
established as a matter of tradition, and the measure of procedural
protections built into the regulatory scheme.293
What does all of this discussion forbode for the Iowa water
permit statute? Several sections of the Iowa act would seem to be susceptible to attack on delegation of powers grounds. Under section
455A.20 the Water Commissioner is directed to issue a permit if he
determines that the use in question "will not be detrimental to the
public interests . . . , or to the interests of property owners with
prior or superior rights who might be affected. . . ." Later in the
same section in relation to renewal permits, it is provided ". . . permits may be renewed by the Water Commissioner for any period of
time not to exceed ten years." Section 455A.21 attempts to assist
the administrator in his deliberations by directing him that "the declared policies and principles of beneficial use, as set forth in this
chapter, shall be the standard for determination. . . ." Section
455A.28 authorizes the Water Commissioner to modify or cancel a
permit ". . . in case of any breach of the terms or conditions
thereof or in case of any violation of the law pertaining thereto by
292. Lewis Consolidated School District v. Johnston, 256 Iowa 236, 127 N.W.2d 118
(1964).
293. See 1 Cooper, supra note 262, 74-91, 1 K. Davis, supra note 261, § 2.10.
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the permittee . . . or in case the Water Commissioner finds such
modification or cancellation necessary to protect the public health
or safety or to protect the public interests in lands or waters, or to
prevent substantial injury to persons or property in any manner."
In relation to the issuance of a permit, it could be argued that the
standards are illusory and in fact the Water Commissioner is given
complete discretion in the issuance of a permit. After all, whether a
use is detrimental to the public interest or to other private rights is
not a matter of fact; these are matters requiring the exercise of the
Commissioner's judgment. If the judgment goes against the applicant, the permit is not issued. How many definitions might be imagined to such vague terms as "detrimental," "public interest" and
"superior rights." Are these meaningful guidelines for the exercise
of administrative discretion? Does reference to the "policies and
principles of beneficial use" serve to chart the administrator's path
of decision?
Similarly, where are the standards governing the exercise of the
Commissioner's discretion in renewing a permit? Presumably, if the
Commissioner may renew a permit, he also may not. What criteria
are to be employed in determining whether or not to renew? The
same sort of objections can be raised concerning the modification and
cancellation powers. What standards control the terms and conditions on which a permit is issued, the breach of which may lead to
cancellation? What Solomon knows when "any manner" of injury
to persons or property is substantial? Of what law pertaining to
permits may the violation lead to cancellation or modification of the
permit; is it the rules and regulations promulgated by the Council?
Anyone familiar with state delegation of powers cases will realize
that these questions are by no means spurious or facetious. These
are the kinds of inquiries courts make when issues of legislative
standards are presented to them. The rhetorical nature of many of
these questions indicates the potential vulnerability of the Iowa
statute. But how vulnerable is it really?
Projecting the water statute against the backdrop of Iowa authority, no completely analogous situation emerges. Although the public
has a great interest in water, regulation of the resource may not
quite reach the level of police power exercise found in the health and
safety regulation cases, although a sound argument could be made
that it should. 9 4 On the other hand, the private rights being regu294. Cf. State v. Van Trump, 224 Iowa 504, 275 N.W. 569 (1937) where a rule
making grant to the Conservation Commission was held an unconstitutional delegation.
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lated are of questionable substance. Consider the tenuous nature of
both the existing interests being regulated and the new rights created
by the statute. Hardly the weighty variety of rights that cause the
judicial balancing arm to tilt abruptly downward.
The situation posed by the water regulation statute is more similar to the Miller and Lewis School District cases where the test employed by the court seemed to be whether the explicitness of the legislative standards were reasonably appropriate to the flexibility and
discretion necessarily required of the administrative agency by reason of the complexity of the task with which it is charged. If the
water act is measured against this criterion, the chances for a finding
of constitutional delegation seem bright.
It cannot be said in connection to the water statute, as was said in
Lewis School District, that no standards were provided by the legislature. The act purports to provide standards, although in some instances it may be necessary to imply them. The principal difficulty is
the vagueness of the standards. However, water use regulation is an
incredibly complex matter. Such regulation necessarily involves utilization of the talents of an expert administrative agency. Assuming
the legislature has determined to regulate water (and note that a
paramount state interest in water resources was declared), how
much more definite standards than those contained in the act could
be formulated? Is beneficial use not a standard that can be intelligently interpreted?2" 5 The difficulty of creating more specific guidelines was compounded by the fact that nowhere had experience at
the type of regulation envisioned by the Iowa statute been acquired.
Judged on a common sense basis, the standards provided by the
water statute should be found sufficient considering the uncertainties
inherent in the regulatory venture at issue and the high current public interest in safeguarding the continued availability of adequate
296
water supplies.
295. For an excellent collection of cases discussing the constitutional adequacy of a
standard couched in terms of "beneficial uses" see Ziegler, Statutory Regulation and
Water Resources, in Water Resources and the Law 87, 97-101 (1958).
296. An excellent statement of the permissive doctrine relating to legislative delegation is contained in American Power and Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
The legislative process would frequently bog down if Congress were constitutionally required to appraise beforehand the myriad situations to which it
wishes a particular policy to be applied and to formulate specific rules for
each situation. Necessity therefore fixes a point beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe detailed rules; it then
becomes constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general
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Reinforcing this view of the act's validity are such factors as the
adequate procedural guarantees provided in the statute, the availability of judicial review to correct abuses, the non-penal nature of
the statute, and the circumstance that under the statute the agency is
performing something of a proprietary function-managing a resource owned by the state. Also of possible relevance is the fact that
the Water Commissioner has over the last ten years succeeded in
inerpreting and applying these vague standards to develop a rational
and workable administrative system that has so far operated in such
a fashion as to minimize the likelihood of the kinds of dissatisfaction that give rise to constitutional litigation.
One other rather far-fetched constitutional issue should be noted
in passing. The Iowa act provided that "[a]ny person aggrieved"
may appeal to the district court from a determination by the Natural
Resources Council, and that the court is to try the matter de novo
with the burden on the Council to prove its acts "reasonable and
necessary." The court has power to "make such order to take the
place of the order appealed from as it is justified by the record before it."' 29 7 This provision might possibly be thought to present a
constitutional question under the Iowa separation of powers provision as it purports to allow the court to review and alter all aspects of the Council's orders.
Courts often indulge in de novo review of certain acts deemed to
concern an administrative agency's "judicial function." Other acts
considered to concern the discretion of the agency in its area of expertise, are termed "nonjudicial" functions, and it is review of these
matters that is occasionally declared unconstitutional as an invasion
of the executive power. 9 Although the Iowa act seems to authorize
the courts to substitute their judgment for the Natural Resources
Council's discretion in its area of expertise, it is unlikely the review
provision could be successfully challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of executive power to the judiciary. Such an arrangement is
probably unwise, but it should not be unconstitutional.
policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority. Private rights are protected by access to the courts to test the
policy in the light of these legislative declarations.
297. Iowa Code §455A.37 (1962).
298. See Sellin v. City of Duluth, 248 Minn. 333, 80 N.W.2d 67 (1956) (discharge
of employees) ; Jones v. Marsh, 148 Tex. 362, 224- S.W.2d 198 (1949) (denial of license) ; Household Fin. Corp. v. State, 40 Wash. 2d 451, 244 P.2d 260 (1952) (denial of license) ; Jaffe v. State Dept. of Health, 135 Conn. 339, 64 A.2d 330 (1949)
(revocation of license).
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This work might appropriately have been entitled "A humid decade
of experience, etc." One factor that must constantly be kept in mind
in evaluating this discussion of the Iowa experience is the circumstance that this water allocation scheme, born in the drought years
of the mid 1950's, has had its infancy blessed with nearly a decade
of relatively abundant water supplies. This general plentitude of
water has been something of a mixed blessing. It has enabled the
administrative agency delegated to carry out the legislative plan to
evolve its regulatory techniques with a minimum of resistance. On
the other hand, the relative lack of competition for Iowa's water
has postponed the kind of conflicts that constitute the sternest test
for such a regulatory scheme. The permit system seems to work
very well in Iowa, but there is always that haunting uncertainty of
how it will work under the stress of drought.
Adoption of the Iowa water permit system signaled the beginning
of a new era in Iowa water use law, but the Iowa act was by no
means a radical solution to water allocation problems in terms of
either the changes actually wrought in Iowa water rights or the
contemporary thinking about water use as reflected by the water
law of other states. Although the Iowa system has several unique
characteristics that render it readily distinguishable from other
states' water use laws, the Iowa statute is essentially eclectic, attempting to draw the best and most appropriate features from a
number of different sources. As written and administered, the system
is characterized by an extremely broad coverage of water uses and
a relatively low degree of regulation thereof.
Because the Iowa legislation seemingly was generated in great
measure by concern about increased demand for drought-diminished
stream supplies anticipated from a rapidly growing interest in irrigation within the area, the principal regulating function of the Iowa
system has been to settle the heretofore uncertain position of irrigation in the hierarchy of water uses. Under the riparian system, it
was unclear whether any priority existed between various uses such
as municipal, industrial and irrigation; all are artificial uses, but
only irrigation is completely consumptive. Under the permit system
as administered, an irrigation use in excess of 5,000 gallons a day is a
regulated use while municipal and industrial uses are initially unregulated. Further, among regulated uses, the totally source depleting nature of irrigation is recognized through the specification of
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protected minimum flows in the permits of all irrigators withdrawing from streams. The effect of the protected minimum flow requirement is to prevent consumptive users from withdrawing water during periods of low flow that would otherwise be available to nonconsumptive users. To date, only irrigation permits regularly contain
protected flow limitations, although some other uses may be partially
source depleting. Thus, to the extent the irrigator had rights equal
to other artificial users under Iowa's riparian rules, the Water Permit statute has altered those rights through recognition of the essential difference between irrigation and other less consumptive
uses. However, in all likelihood no persuasive constitutional objections can be raised concerning this alteration of an indefinite right
into a regulated use.
Aside from the changes relating to irrigation, Iowa water users
have approximately the same rights under the statute as they did
under common law. True, if their use exceeds the statutory minimum, they must apply for a permit, but if the use is beneficial (and
it is difficult to conceive of a user making a non-benficial use, as the
term is defined in the statute) the permit may be obtained with a
minimum of expense and delay. Presumably, any one may receive a
permit to use water if he can show his use beneficial. The statute
makes no requirement that the user own land contiguous to the water
supply. This represents a departure from riparian principles, but because no power to obtain access rights is granted in the statute, it is
unlikely that many non-riparians will seek permits. Another change
of little practical consequence is the possibility of losing a water use
right through non-use created by the act.
Because the law, as administered, attempts to create no priorities
among users, permittees under the act occupy the same general po.
sition as did riparian owners under the common law. Rights of water
users not regulated by the statute are still apparently fully governed
by riparian principles. No real advantage is enjoyed by regulated or
non-regulated users over one another, save in the case of irrigators.
Other than regulating irrigation, the principal achievement of the
Iowa act has been the creation of a base upon which further regulation can be built when it becomes necessary to do so. The permit
system serves several very important purposes. In the first place it
establishes conclusively the principle that water use is an appropriate
subject for regulation in Iowa and it allows for the development of
an administrative framework through which future problems can
be handled. Secondly, it takes the formulation of water rules away
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from the courts, and places it in the hands of a public agency which
will presumably develop considerable expertise in handling the problems of water use. Moreover, it serves the very important function
of gathering information. Many of the problems encountered in the
common-law rules concerning riparian owners and ground water
were due to a lack of factual knowledge about water. No efficient
regulatory system can exist until it is known how much water is
available, how it is used, and what effect such use has on the supply.
This information is now being systematically gathered and recorded.
Finally, the Iowa act provides for the public enforcement of the
newly promulgated water rules. Violations of the common law
water rules could be ended only by those private citizens who had
standing to complain of the violations. This was, at best, an inefficient system of enforcement. The Iowa act provides an agency which
is attuned to the public interest, and which is given the power to
enforce the rules by which the public interest is served. The permit
system does not contain the answers to all the questions concerning
the use of Iowa's water resources; it does, however, provide many
of the tools through which those answers may ultimately be found.
The temptation at this juncture is to include a long and detailed
list assembling in one place all of the relatively minor suggestions
and recommendations scattered throughout this work. Such a list
would undoubtedly include some fairly important items such as the
suggested amendment to cure the shadowy vested rights problem and
the recommendation relating to providing better notice of hearings
to affected third parties. This temptation is resisted in favor of
placing concentration on one issue that strikes to the very heart of
the permit system under development in Iowa.
Perhaps the most unusual characteristic of the Iowa system, at
least as presently administrated, is that it does not purport to do
that which one would normally suppose to be the purpose of water
regulation-the establishment of priorities of use for times of
scarcity.
The supply of water is relatively inelastic, but the demand for it
is not. Population and technological advances in the next century
may put a severe strain on our water resources. There is a limit to
the number of users, consumptive or otherwise, that can coexist in
using any water source without rendering that source permanently
near or below the level required for it to be fully used beneficially by
anyone. If and when water demands reach that stage in Iowa,
necessity will compel the water administrators to discriminate be-
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tween beneficial uses, and to grant priorities to those which are
most beneficial in the light of the public interest.
At present, and for the immediate future, our resources are probably great enough to justify the practice of granting a permit for
any beneficial use. Increased regulation may not be necessary as long
as water scarcity is caused only by occasional temporary shortages
or droughts. At some point in the future, however, this policy is
likely to require re-examination.
If current projections of future water demands are to be believed,
the time of true competition for water may not be as far away as
many Iowans believe. If the Iowa permit system is to be an enduring
institution in the water allocation field, those responsible for its
development must face up to the need to begin thinking about the
priorities problems of the future now while time still remains to
fully investigate and reflect on the matter. Establishing priorities is
such a difficult undertaking because no recognized standards exist
for evaluating the relative beneficialness of a use. It seems very
likely that the greatest contribution the present water administration could make to assuring the orderly future development of
Iowa's resources would be to commence now the protean process of
research and deliberation that must underlie the creation of standards for distinguishing among beneficial uses. The hour may already be late.

